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PREFACE 
This thesis has grown out of a long-term interest in 
arms control and disarmament, and a desire to understand 
why and how arms control agreements have been reached in 
the past. My research into pre-World War One Anglo-German 
-
relations, dealing in particular with the great battleship 
race, was motivated by my desire to compare this 
relationship to Hans Morganthau's postulate as a test of 
its validity. This political realist argues that a 
"political settlement must precede disarmament. Without 
political settlement, disarmament has no chance for 
success." 1 
There is the immediate need to modify at least one 
point on Morganthau's theory in order for it to have any 
relevance to prewar Anglo-German relations. There was 
never any serious attempt made to conclude an actual naval 
disarmament treaty between Britain and Germany, but 
statesmen on both sides of the North Sea did desire some 
form of arms control arrangement at one time or another. 
For the purposes of my thesis, arms control shall be 
defined as the regulation of an "armaments race for the 
purpose of creating a measure of military stability," while 
disarmament is the "transformation of the international 
politics by eliminating its destructive and anarchical 
iii 
tendencies." 2 The point is that the basic difference 
between disarmament and arms control is one of elimination 
versus limitation. However, the main consideration 
remains: will a great power agree to limit its sovereign 
right to maintain armaments at a level that it considers 
necessary for its own security by signing an agreement with 
another nation that has interests and views different 
enough to preclude basic political understanding with the 
first country? Placed in these terms, "arms control" can 
be used in place of "disarmament," because the principle 
remains the same; both types of agreement require a 
limitation on what a state may legitimately Jo to provide 
for its own security. 
As my research progressed, it quickly became apparent 
that the Haldane Mission--and the negotiations that 
followed it during the first quarter of 1912--formed the 
focal point of the diplomatic relationship between Germany 
and Great Britain in regard to the naval and political 
questions during the years prior to the outbreak of the 
Great War. During this series of talks the fundamental 
policies of the two states toward each other were refined 
and £ocused to the highest degree achieved. The two years 
that followed the br0akdown in the talks, in the words of 
Paul Kennedy, "form virtually a diplomatic epilogue." 3 An 
examination of the Haldane talks provides the best means 
for explaining what the policies coming fron1 Berlin and 
London were, and why the two were unable to settle their 
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outstanding differences in a manner that was mutually 
advantageous. 
In general terms the naval arms control agreement, 
which Great Britain considered to be the key to improving 
relations with Imperial Germany, was unobtainable as long 
as there was not a basic political agreement between the 
two states, as sought by Berlin. Morganthau's theory is 
valid so long as one realizes that both states had to 
consider the ~xisting naval balance legitimat~ in order for 
a political understanding to be reached. In other words, a 
nation's armaments policy is indivisible from a nation's 
foreign policy; to have a basic political under-standing 
between two or more states, each state must consider the 
other nation's arms policy to be compatible politically 
with its own. In the case of the Anglo-German battleship 
race and the corre~ponding political difficulties, no 
political understanding--and therefore no arms control 
agreement either--was possible. This was to remain the 
case because Great Britain retained the policy of the "two-
power standard", which required the Royal Navy to maintain 
a strength equal to that of the next two most powerful 
navies, while Germany retained the "risk theory," as the 
basis for its naval policy. This theory was based on the 
assumption that if the German navy was powerful enough so 
that even if the most powerful navy in the world (The Royal 
Navy) attacked Germany, the attacker's fleet would be so 
damaged that such an attack would be irrational and 
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therefore no such assault would be made. 4 
The above is not intended to imply that naval policy 
was the only political matter that tended to alienate these 
two states from each other. The Court of St. James, both 
prior to and during the Haldane Mission, adamantly refused 
to give Germany any firm reassurances that Britain would 
not be a varty to any French scheme of revanche against 
Germany, in exchange for naval concessions from Berlin. 
This_ remained the case even after German Chancellor 
Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg dropped his initial demand 
for a pledge of absolute neutrality and adopted a position 
that made 0ny neutrality pledge dependent on which party in 
any future war was the "aggressor." This concession would 
have allowed Britain to come to the aid of any country that 
Germany attacked or provoked. 
On a more fundamental level it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that economic rivalry was at the root of the 
deteriorating relations between Germany and Britain. 
Although often times couched in different rhetoric, most of 
the important personalities of the time, as well as recent 
historians, have reached the same basic conclusion. Paul 
Kennedy stated that after the turn of the century Britain 
"looked upon a Germany that kept growing as an unwanted and 
troublesome intruder on the sanctity of the British 
supremacy over the commerce and oceans of the world." 5 
Therefore, Britain naturally began to associate with those 
states not on friendly terms with Germany as a means of 
vi 
protecting Britain's dominance of world trade. Paul 
Kennedy argues that the Anglo-German quarrels were 
"manifestations of the relative shift in economic power of 
these two countries between 1860 and 1914." He concludes 
that the root of Anglo-German antagonism is economic; trade 
rivalries and British fear of German industrial growth 
6 drove the two ever farther apart. 
Free trade made nice rhetoric until British traders 
bega~ to encounter German capital interests at nearly every 
point on the globe. Both states needed, or at least 
thought that they needed, room to expand their markets and 
sources of raw materials in order to continue their 
economic growth. Whether this expansion was territorial, 
or commercial, was not of vital importance in the final 
equation. The only way for Germany and Britain to regain a 
measure of international friendship was for one to withdraw 
from the economic competition for dominance of the worlo 
economic system. The competitive nature of their economic 
systems naturally made this an impossibility. 
One must remember that the political questions, which 
will be closely examined in the pages that follow, are 
largely the outgrowths of the economic competition between 
the two nations. Many historians accept the economic 
determinist position then veer off looking for "devils," 
but they simply did not exist, at least as of April, 1912. 
The statesmen who sat in Berlin and London were neither 
diabolical war mongers, nor saints. They were often 
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captives of systems that they neither created, nor 
controlled to any significant extent. 
A long standing misconception, which I hope my thesis 
will help to put an end to, is the commonly held view that 
Germany's Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg was 
never willing to retreat from his demand for a pledge of 
absolute neutrality from Great Britain in exchange for a 
reduction in Germany's naval buildup. This misleading 
inte~pretation continues to find its way into a number of 
works dealing with prewar Anglo-German relations, thus 
making Germany's chancellor out to be one of the "devils." 
The earliest secondary source that I have found that makes 
this "absolute neutrality" mistake is Sidney B. Fay's The 
Origins of the World War, published in 1928, and even Paul 
Kennedy's recent work, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 
1860-1914 (1980), still continues to argue the same 
position. Other authors who subscribe to this view incltide 
Zar0 Steiner, Peter Padfield and Fritz Fischer. 7 Although 
the Haldane Mission represents only a relatively smell part 
of each of the works by the authors mentioned, the fact 
that Germany's position continues to be misinterpreted by a 
number of ~lfferent authors suggests that a review of what 
Germany's policy was toward Britain, is needed. It seems 
that this should proceed before more work is done on why 
Gern1any adopted the policies it did. We need to know what 
German policy was before we can have any hope of 
understanding why it developed the way it did. 
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The fact that Bethmann-Hollweg was willing to accept a 
neutrality formula with an escape clause hinging on which 
party to a conflict was the "aggressor" does not 
necessarily mean the whole interpretation of Germany as the 
initiator of many of the problems between that country and 
England (as well as other European countries) is entirely 
wrong. It does suggest that as late as 1912, Germany was 
less aggressive and unreasonable than a number of prominent 
historians have been willing to acknowledge. On the other 
side of the story, because Germany was in fact more 
reasonable in its desires than the historiography of Anglo-
German relations suggests, Britain was less reasonable than 
some historisns have posited, in what it hoped to work out 
with Germany. Thus it is only logical to conclude that the 
behavioral and motiv~tional differences between "liberal" 
Britain and "conservative" Germany were not as great as 
many historians to date have argued. 
I wish to conclude by expressing my sincPre gratitude 
to those persons whose assistance made the completion of 
th~s thesis possible. A great deal of thanks belongs to my 
major adviser Dr. George F. Jewsbury, whose patience, 
guidance, and toleranc0 have been of invaluable help and 
inspiration. To the other two members of my committee, Dr. 
John Paul Bischoff and Dr. w. Roger Biles, I also wish to 
express my appreciation for the time and council they 
contributed to this project. Thanks also to the various 
faculty members with whom I have had.the privilege of 
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studying under during my stay at Oklahoma State University. 
Much of the credit for any value that this work has belongs 
to those mentioned above, and naturally the blame for any 
mistakes or shortcomings rests entirely with the author. 
The number of persons who contributed to my academic 
progress are certainly to numerous to list here, but I 
would like to mention a few of those who come to mind. The 
financial and emotional support of my parents and 
gran9parents have done much to lighten the burdens of my 
chosen career. I must also put forth a word of 
appreciation to my close friend and most constant critic 
Eric Hazell. Finally, I wish to thank my wife Stephanie 
whose support deserves a greater reward than simply a line 
in a preface. 
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CHAPTER I 
GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP TO 1912 
As a bottle of champagne crashed against the bow of 
His ~ajesty's ship Dreadnought and that mighty vessel slid 
down the ramp into the sea, a new era in armaments 
competition began. Five years into the twentieth century 
this new vessel and the class of battleships based on its 
model of construction made every other battleship in all of 
the European navies obsolete. Prior to the construction of 
H.M.S. Dreadnought, the Royal Navy had such a preponderance 
in numbers of battleships that it was nearly impossible for 
any other European great power, or combination of powers~ 
to threaten Britain's control of the seas. In antiquating 
its own war-ships along with everyone elses, Britain 
inadvertently provided Germany with the opportunity, and to 
a degree the necessity, to begin building dreadnought class 
vessels from a position only slightly behind that of the 
British. Since the passage of the German Naval Law of 
1900, London had become increasingly anxious about naval 
construction on the far side of the North Sea; however, it 
took the "Dreadnought Revolution" to turn the nervousness 
of the years directly following the Law of 1900, into the 
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open arms race that marked the decade just prior to the 
outbreak of the war. 
The conflicting naval programs of Great Britain and 
Germany, which spawned the battleship race, were only one 
part of the general competition between these two powers 
that tended to drive them apart. Indeed, Britain as an 
established player in the world arena and Germany as the 
"newcomer" had much more to dispute than the degree of 
certainty His Majesty's Government should have about the 
Royal Navy's ability to control the seas. Before an 
adequate examination can be undertaken of the Haldane 
Mission, which represents the last ambitious attempt to 
bring the two nations to a general understanding, an 
analysis of Anglo-German relations prior to the Winter of 
1912 is required. 
It is difficult to reach a definite conclusion about 
what German foreign policy was during the early-twentieth 
century. Commonly used terms such as Weltmacht and 
Realpolitik often serve only to intensify confusion when 
trying to distinguish what the erratic Kaiser Wilhelm II 
and his ministers were thinking at any time. Yet there is 
an identifiable outline of German policy. 
Faced with constructing a new policy after the 
dismissal of Bismarck, Wilhelm II and his cadre of 
secretaries spent the years up to 1897 developing a policy 
that intended to make Germany the fourth world power 
(England, Russia and the United States had supposedly 
2 
already reached this position according to German 
planners). In order to achieve this new status, Germany 
planned to establish a large overseas empire made up of 
territories formally under the rule of Berlin along with a 
neocolonial empire controlled by German trade and capital. 
In order to protect the overseas empire and trade, Germany 
3 
required the construction of a large fleet. The fleet was 
also to be used as a tool for placing pressure on those 
states that resisted Germany•s expansion. This plan to 
achieve Weltmacht status naturally put Germany at odds with 
Great Britain, since both colonial expansion and the 
increase in the German navy would place it at odds with the 
nation then preponderant in both of these categories. 
Germany•s ever expanding foreign trade interests had 
already come to concern many in Great Britain, prior to the 
naval and colonial bids initiated in Berlin. 1 
Many Germans viewed their nation as rising inevitably 
toward an important worldwide position and in typical 
Social-Darwinistic terms concluded that this expansion 
could not be halted even if Germany itself tried to do so. 
European conquest was not the goal, at least not during the 
time-frame of this study. 2 Germany needed outlets for its 
surplus production and population, not more industrialized 
and densely populated territory in Europe. 3 
In regard to the naval policy, Germany adopted what is 
commonly referred to as the "risk theory." This theory was 
first printed in the memorandum attached to the Naval Law 
4 
of 1900, and its key elements state that Germany must have, 
in order to protect her colonies and overseas trade, "a 
battle fleet so strong that even for the adversary with the 
greatest seapower a war against it would involve such 
dangers as to imperil his position in the world." 
Obviously the "greatest seapower" was England and, 
therefore, there was no real question as to whose navy the 
German fleet would be gauged by. The memorandum continues 
to say it was not essential that: 
the German Battle Fleet should be as strong as that of 
the greatest naval Power, for a great naval Power will 
not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all 
its striking forces against us. But even if it should 
succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of 
strength, the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so 
substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of the 
victory he might have obtained, his own position in 
the world would no longer be secured by an adequate 
fleet. 
The implementation of this theory was to ensure "peace with 
4 honor." 
In translating this into practical terms, Germany's 
leading naval authority Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz 
concluded that the Imperial Navy needed to maintain a fleet 
of approximately two-thirds the strength of that of the 
5 Royal Navy. During this time, the common rule of thumb 
among military authorities was that a nation had to have at 
least a seventy percent chance of success before a high 
command could recommend going to war. One may assume that 
by maintaining a naval strength ratio of two to three, 
Tirpitz could safely say that British naval authorities 
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could not tell the Cabinet that Britain had a seventy 
percent chance of success against Germany and still would 
have a large enough fleet at the end of hostilities to deal 
with other sea powers, if need be. Although Paul Kennedy's 
assertion that Tirpitz appears to have desired absolute 
parity with Great Britain may be true in an abstract sense, 
the ratio that the Admiral was willing to agree to in the 
event of a political agreement shows that strict equality 
was not considered an absolute must by any means. Kennedy 
then states that if his assumption is true, then British 
and German naval aims were entirely irreconcilable. In 
fact, their naval aims were never reconciled, but the 
irreconcilable ratios were Germany's desire to possess a 
navy that approximated two-thirds that of Britain's, and 
Britain's refusal to abandon the "two power standard," or 
its strategic equivalent. 6 
Britain had initially adopted the "two power" stand~rd 
in the nineteenth century when France and Russia possessed 
the second and third largest navies. It made sense for the 
Royal Navy to maintain its force at a level equal to these 
two powers, because it was conceivable that Britain might 
end up fighting them both. However, shortly after the 
turn-of-the-century the United States and Germany had 
become the possessors of the second and third largest 
navies in the world. Because it was all but inconceivable 
that Britain would find itself at war with both of these 
rising powers, the old formula for calculating the strength 
6 
of the Royal Navy was largely impractical from about 1903 
onward. The admiralty and cabinet began to calculate naval 
estimates with an eye on reasonable possibilities, such as 
a possible war pitting Great Britain against members of the 
Triple Alliance. After 1908-09 the British navy generally 
subscribed to the rule that it should be 60 percent 
superior to the German navy. 7 In practice this translated 
into keeping a ratio of about 1 to 1.6, after the naval 
programs of the two powers began to level out in about 
1912. 8 Thus the difference between Germany's desired 
ratio, and that which Britain satisfied itself with in 
principle were quite similar. One may conclude that the 
fact that the naval question was never solved is more a 
reflection of poor relations on other levels than it is a 
reflection of the two countries inability to reach a 
mutually agreed upon ratio for their naval forces. 
A more traditional element of German policy than that 
of aiming to achieve the status of a world and naval power 
was visible in the measures taken that were intended to 
prevent the formation of an anti-German coalition. This 
policy, which the successive ministries during the reign of 
Wilhelm II bungled to incredible proportions, can be traced 
back to Bismarck's push for unification in the 1860s. With 
a quick glance at a map of prewar Europe one can quickly 
understand Germany's fear of encirclement; the Empire had 
extended land borders with three great powers and England 
dominated the sea approaches to Germany's few port cities. 
Starting with the refusal of Wilhelm II to renew the 
Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, which culminated in the 
Franco-Russian alliance, and ending with the consolidation 
of the Entente Cordiale during the two Moroccan crises, 
Berlin's policy of preventing an anti-German coalition had 
the ironic effect of helping to produce one. 9 During the 
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chancellorship of Bernhard von Bulow the worst fears of the 
Imperial government came true through the forging of the 
ententes between, first Britain and France, and then 
between Britain and Russia. 
Regardless of whose fault it was that this situation 
arose, Germany was in a position of having no choice but to 
maintain its relationship with Austria by the end of the 
Second Moroccan Crisis. The only conceivable way out of 
this virtual isolation was to split Britain from France and 
Russia, which would certainly have been the preferred 
method from Germany's point of view, or to have found some 
position between the alliance systems that would have been 
acceptable to both Berlin and London. 
The center piece of Great Britain's foreign policy was 
based on two related strategic goals. The first was to 
maintain a balance of power on the continent; the second 
was to make sure that none of the continental powers ever 
became militarily secure enough to be able to direct its 
full attention to its navy. So long as these two 
conditions were maintained, the Royal Navy could easily 
maintain its overwhelming superiority in comparison to all 
. 1 . 1 10 potent1a r1va s. 
Directly after the turn of the century, London began 
to conclude that Germany was becoming a threat. Robert 
Haldane, British Minister of War during the Asquith 
8 
Ministry, argued that the Ententes became necessary because 
the Central Powers had continued to increase in power in 
relation to the rest of Europe. Germany's growing naval 
and military might made it necessary for Britain, as 
Haldane explained, to abandon "splendid isolation" in order 
to "preserve our margine [sic] of strength at sea, but 
[also] to make ourselves able ••• to help our friends in 
case of aggression, thereby securing ourselves."11 The 
policy of the Liberal, Asquith ministry toward Germany 
became one that was supposed to preserve the peace between 
the two countries, and the rest of Europe, by removing 
"difficulties" and misunderstandings, and by preparing for 
war in such a way as not to provoke one. Thus, the 
ultimate reason for London's binding of Great Britain to 
France and Russia was its view that Germany was becoming 
12 too strong. 
The changes that brought about the shift in British 
policy that culminated in the ententes corresponded with 
the increasing number of persons within the British Foreign 
Office who were Francophiles--or at least were more 
disposed to be friendly to France than Germany. Sir Edward 
Grey was the prime example of this trend. His policy of 
diplomatic and if necessary military and naval support for 
9 
France was endorsed by such important Whitehall figures 
as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
(1906-1910) Charles Hardinge, Ambassador at Paris Francis 
Bertie, Senior Clerk and later Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs Eyre Crowe, Louis Mallett and Sir 
Edward Grey's personal secretary William Tyrell. Some of 
these men were true "cold warriors" with Germany being 
little short of incarnate evil and others, such as Grey, 
were_willing to try to deal with Germany, so long as it did 
not in any way impair the Entente Cordiale. 13 
Recently the argument has emerged that maintains the 
"anti-Germanism" exhibited by the British Foreign Office 
during the decade prior to the outbreak of the war "was 
simply the face of this Anglomania [exhibited by the 
Germans] that was turned towards Germany." The foreign 
office saw Germany as constantly trying to isolate Britain 
and "to the Germans it was a perfectly legitimate activity 
which they openly admitted." In light of Germany's policy 
of preventing the formation of a hostile coalition, or any 
combination that could serve as the foundation for one, the 
above thesis holds up; probably the British diplomats did 
see the situation in this manner. In keeping with long 
standing policy, Germany did repeatedly try to break up, or 
weaken the Entente Cordiale. Where this argument falls 
short is that it does not deal with the fact that Whitehall 
was unwilling to give Germany any meaningful reassurances 
that the ententes would not form the basis of an 
10 
"aggressive" coalition against Germany. 14 
Thus, London's concern for the safety of France was in 
fact a concern for maintaining Britain's position in the 
world, should the former country cease to be a great power. 
Germany would quickly outclass Britain in every conceivable 
category if all of central and western Europe were to come 
under the sway of the Hohenzollern crown. The battleship 
race was simply the most visible aspect of a competition 
that-took place between Britain and Germany on a variety of 
levels. 
It is difficult to assess the positions taken by the 
various major figures at the German Foreign Office 
(commonly referred to as Wilhelmstrasse) and even more 
difficult to ascertain how influential any one person was 
within the broader framework of German foreign policy. 
Several persons do, however, need to be mentioned briefly 
because of their influence in forming German policy toward 
Britain. In "setting the cast" an explanation will also be 
given of the constitutional framework of the foreign 
office. 
It is of course only fitting to start with a look at 
the highly intelligent, yet erratic Kaiser Wilhelm II. 
Constitutionally all matters of foreign affairs were 
controlled by the emperor. 15 Unlike his grandfather, who 
was virtually always overshadowed by his chancellor, 
Wilhelm II took an active role in the shaping of German 
policy. In regard to Great Britain, he had a "love-hate 
relationship"16 that he apparently could never settle in 
his own mind. His obsession with the navy provided the 
momentum for its expansion without which it could never 
have reached the size it did. The navy was one area of 
policy about which Wilhelm would tolerate no hint of 
criticism from his ministers and officials. 17 In other 
areas of policy the Emperor was often more flexible; in a 
11 
number of cases he found himself carried along on ventures 
pushed by one of his chancellors or senior diplomats that 
• 
. t h. b . d 18 was aga~ns ~s etter JU gment. 
The Emperor appointed a chancellor to head the 
government, and was also free to dismiss him, along with 
any other appointed official. During the period under 
examination the chancellor was Theobald von Bethmann-
Hollweg. He had been appointed to this office in 1909, 
after having served first a Prussian Minister of the 
Interior and then as German Minister of Interior. Due to 
his lack of experience in matters of foreign affairs, as 
was also true of Edward Grey when he assumed control of the 
British foreign office, it is questionable as to the wisdom 
of his being chosen. But in regard to Anglo-German 
relations, the Emperor chose Bethmann-Hollweg knowing that 
he favored rapprochement with the Court of St. James. 19 
The German ambassador in London during the first 
twelve years of the twentieth century was Count Paul von 
Wolff Metternich. In his duties in Great Britain, he fully 
realized that the most visible cause of Anglo-German 
It is difficult to overstate Great Britain's 
dependence on foreign trade. Although the island nation 
was self sufficient in several critical areas, such as 
coal, it was subject to foreign sources for most of its 
food supply. For example, Britain had to import 
approximately four-fifths of that most critical of 
commodities--wheat, one-fourth of its oats, and one-third 
13 
of its Barley throughout the first decade of the twentieth 
centqry (TABLE I). 
TABLE I 
QUANTITIES OF VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL GOODS PRODUCEo 21 
AND CONSUMED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1910 
(in thousands of bushels) 
Commodity Consumed Produced = Imported 
Wheat 
Barley 
Oats 
Maize 
Total 
273,559 
99,008 
226,324 
73,607 
672,498 
56,593 
63,044 
175,794 
0 
295,431 
Such figures make it easy to understand the British 
216,966 
35,964 
50,530 
73,607 
377,067 
assertion that controlling the seas was a "matter of life 
and death," for England. 
-Britain continually maintained an unfavorable balance 
of trade in the decades leading up to the Great War, but 
international trade continued to provide the foundation for 
the economy of the United Kingdom. In 1910, British 
imports were valued at 536 million pounds, while exports 
22 totaled only 418 million pounds. However, when one 
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tension was the ever expanding Imperial navy. Most of the 
officials at Wilhelmstrasse agreed and did not want to 
continue with the comparatively rapid expansion of the 
navy; what made Metternich different was the fact that he 
continued to voice his concerns about the navy even when 
the Emperor lashed out at him for doing so. Asquith 
described Metternich as being "not very genial and he led a 
retired and almost isolated life in London •••• He was, 
however, a shrewd and dispassionate observer both of men 
and events." 20 One of the most obvious signs that the 
negotiations following the Haldane Mission represented the 
last ambitious attempt by Germany to reach an accord with 
Great Britain was the fact that Metternich left London 
after the talks collapsed. The cause of peace certainly 
did not benefit from his absence. 
Although this thesis deals mostly with political 
matters it seems prudent to examine briefly the economic 
factors that were largely responsible for Germany and Great 
Britain adopting the policies that they did. The demands 
of the expanding German economy were as responsible for 
that nation's bid for Weltmacht status as the economic 
needs in Great Britain were for London's continued policy 
of striving to maintain the balance of power in Europe. 
The fact that these two countries adopted policies that 
tended to increase tensions between them coincides with 
the fact that the two nations were increasingly at odds in 
trade and commercial matters. 
considers "invisible" trade, such as interest on foreign 
loans, insurance, dividends and shipping fees Britain 
probably did still maintain a favorable trade balance. 23 
The fact that so much of the worlds ocean going trade was 
carried in British bottoms, was just one more reason for 
the demand that the Royal Navy maintain its maritime 
dominance. 
14 
In regard to Anglo-German trade, the two countries had 
very-nearly reached an equilibrium around 1910, with 
Britain having only a slight advantage. During that year 
Germany was Britain's largest single customer, and the only 
nation that sold more to the United Kingdom than Germany 
did, was the United States. 24 This fact should have tended 
to lessen tensions on both sides of the North Sea, but the 
larger economic picture was not as favorable. 
In absolute terms Britain's share of world trade had 
grown along with the gross volume of worldwide trade; 
however, Britain's relative share dropped from 23 percent 
of world trade in 1880 to only 17 percent in 1913. During 
the same period Germany's percentage of world trade grew 
from 10 percent to 13 percent. 25 In manufacturing capacity 
Britain was also losing ground, as is shown by its decline 
from 1880 when the United Kingdom produced 22.9 percent of 
world manufacturing output to 1913 when it contributed only 
13.6 percent. In the same thirty-three years Germany grew 
from its early position of 8.5 percent to 14.8 percent, 
thereby, surpassing its North Sea riva1. 26 
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It is more difficult to gain an accurate appraisal of 
German trade in specific goods, but the fact becomes clear 
that it too was becoming quite dependent on foreign sources 
f . 1 d. t. 27 or v1ta commo 1 1es. For example, Germany imported 
2,924 million marks worth of food and foodstuff more than 
was exported during 1910. 28 Germany produced 3,861,479 
tonnes (1000 kg) of wheat during the same year, and 
imported another 2,092,442 tonnes. From that quantity of 
imported wheat 1,495,799 tonnes came from Russia and 
another 324,910 tonnes came from Argentina. 29 During that 
year Britain continued to be Germany's best customer, while 
Russia was the number one supplier of goods and commodities 
to the Reich. 30 Germany too maintained a trade deficit 
with imports valued at 19,400 million marks and exports of 
16,077 million marks for 1910. 31 
This relatively simple picture of Germany within the 
world economy is one that shows that country becoming ever 
more dependent on the outside world for its continued 
economic development. Foodstuffs, the most basic of 
requirements, had to be obtained from outside; they either 
had to come over water from the Western Hemisphere (and 
past -the United Kingdom), or from Russia. Under the 
alliance system of the time Germany's economic predicament 
in a war against the Entente powers was a grave one, as the 
events of the World War demonstrated. 
It seems relatively clear that the United Kingdom and 
Germany had to deal with very similar· economic 
16 
circumstances. Both were at the mercy of foreign sources 
of r~w materials and food, and both suffered from a lack of 
overseas markets in relation to their demands for imports. 
Germany had originally entered the colonial scramble 
largely out of fear that the world markets and sources of 
raw materials would be "gobbled up" by the other powers of 
32 
western Europe. As the trade rivalry intensified after 
1890, groups advocating colonial expansion, trade 
restrictions and, later on, big navies grew up in both 
states largely as a response to the economic rivalries of 
the time. The British pressure groups and government were 
largely trying to defend an eroding world position, while 
the Germans were struggling to continue their growth 
relative to the rest of the world. Yet the difference 
between them was one of degree, not of kind; they both were 
struggling to shape the outside world in such a way as to 
benefit themselves economically. 
The political-economic situation of 1911 placed 
Germany in an encircled position. Partially this was a 
trick of geography and Berlin brought about many of its own 
problems, but a number of key persons in Britain as well as 
France worked to contain Germany. Wilhelmstrasse tried 
repeatedly from 1907 to 1914, to break out of this 
uncomfortable situation. Germany basically had two options 
to choose from to form a policy towards Britain that would 
get Germany out of its precarious position. It could 
continue in the spirit of the risk theory to build up its 
navy in the hope that it would eventually be able 
effectively to keep Britain out of any European war and 
thereby, keep the sea lanes at least partially open. The 
other option was to entice London to distance itself 
politically from its entente partners. As later 
developments revealed, Germany never conclusively chose 
either path. 
17 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MISSION 
In the months following the war scares during the 
Agadir Crisis of 1911, 1 it became increasingly obvious to 
statesmen in both Great Britain and Germany that if they 
did not reach some form of understanding on their 
outstanding differences, war might soon be the result. The 
pressures to move towards improved relations came from a 
wide variety of sources and different individuals and 
groups had widely varying opinions on the shape any 
agreement should take. The basic problem remained how to 
reconcile the interests of the two states; one being the 
great status quo power, the other being the great rising 
power in Europe and the world. 
The fact that war had appeared to be so close during 
the summer had caused a number of politically conscious 
persons in Britain to question the direction of British 
foreign policy, and more specifically the wisdom of keeping 
Edward Grey as the foreign minister. By the end of 1911, 
Grey's support in Parliament came largely from 
Conservatives, with the rank and file of the Liberal party 
growing increasingly restive about his policy. 2 The 
Radical wing of the Liberal party was openly calling for 
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Grey's resignation by January 1912, and even the Radicals 
within the cabinet desired a reevaluation of Grey's 
supposedly anti-German policy. According to his opponents, 
Grey was in fact abandoning the Gladstonian traditions of 
the party and steering the country along a course obviously 
against the national interest. At the same time even the 
Conservatives who normally supported him began to show some 
signs of unrest and a desire to improve relations with 
3 Germany. 
It would be incorrect to say that Grey's political 
position was gravely threatened at that point; however, he 
reasoned that if he did not make some effort to improve 
relations with Germany, while remaining vigilant, his 
remaining support might desert him. In order to preserve 
the Liberal cabinet and the entente with France, Grey 
realized that he needed to make what would at least appear 
to be a strong effort to improve relations with Berlin, but 
he certainly was not willing to do anything that might 
weaken or breakup the Entente. 4 With the continued support 
of Asquith, Haldane, and Churchill, Grey remained in a 
position that did not require compromise with the elements 
that-desired closer political ties to Germany. 5 
In Germany the usual intragovernmental struggles 
became more heated, with certain elements calling loudly 
for yet another increase in the Imperial Navy. Tirpitz and 
the big navy advocates took the opportunity that the war 
scares presented to begin working on a Novelle to be 
introduced in 1912. In November 1911, the naval 
authorities once again convinced the Kaiser that the navy 
6 had to be expanded. The supplement was to correct the 
problems that the navy had during the fall of each year 
when new conscripts were introduced to replace the almost 
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one-third of all personnel who mustered out. Under the new 
system Germany would change its naval organization to three 
squadrons in full commission year round as opposed to the 
two squadrons that existed under the pre-1912 naval law. 
The new squadron would relieve the other two from training 
duties and thereby prevent Germany from being vulnerable to 
attack during the fall. In order to form the new squadron 
Tirpitz originally asked for authorization to construct six 
new battleships over six years• Under strong pressure from 
Bethmann-Hollweg the number was reduced to three new ships, 
with several vessels taken from what had previously been 
reserves to provide the remaining number of battleships 
necessary for the third squadron. 7 
At Wilhelmstrasse there was much opposition to any 
naval expansion that would threaten an improvement in 
relations with London. Britain's ties to France and Russia 
made-the job of convincing the rest of the Imperial 
government and country that Germany would be more secure 
and capable of carrying on its program of colonial 
expansion by not expanding the navy a very difficult one. 
Bethmann-Hollweg concluded that the only way to avoid a 
large scale increase in the navy was to reach an agreement 
with Britain that was nearly a neutrality treaty. 8 In 
early December 1911, the Kaiser agreed to a policy of 
seeking a rapprochement under the stipulation that a 
political understanding had to be reached prior to any 
agreement on specifics (presumably the naval race). 
Germany would not consent to confining the growth of its 
navy until Great Britain gave effective assurances that 
Germany would not have to face an attack by two great 
powers from the west. 9 
With both governments desiring to have negotiations, 
24 
the problem then became one of how to initiate them without 
either country appearing to be appealing to the other or 
presenting an ultimatum. In January 1912, British 
financier Ernest Cassel and German shipping magnate Albert 
Ballin solved the problem without either government having 
full knowledge of these outsiders' actions. Each of these 
two men had high ranking contacts in their respective 
t . d d . d t . t . 1 t. 10 coun r~es an es~re o see an ~mprovemen ~n re a ~ons. 
The motives of Ballin and Cassel in this affair seem 
fairly clear and logical. An Anglo-German war would 
threaten Cassel's investments in Germany and elsewhere. 
Any such conflict would have equally disastrous effects on 
Ballin's shipping business, because the Royal Navy would 
quickly sweep the Hamburg-America Line off of the high 
seas. Their long standing friendship and the contacts that 
each had in London and Berlin gave them the means actively 
to protect their own interests, and in this case provide 
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their governments with the means to initiate negotiations 
without either one having to appear to be the supplicant. 
Apparently the two men decided to approach their 
respective governments in such a way as to make it appear 
that the other nation was desiring to initiate the 
conversa-tions. Churchill was first approached by Cassel 
in early January, but the first sea lord gently rebuffed 
his friend's idea. 11 Later that month Ballin sent another 
note_through Cassel to Churchill, which informed him that 
Berlin would like to have a meeting between the authorities 
of the two states at the highest level. This note also 
conveyed the ominous news that Germany was planning to 
propose increases both in its army and navy during the next 
' f h R ' h 12 sess~on o t e e~c stag. Churchill then conveyed the 
message to Grey. 
The foreign minister was placed in the position of 
deciding on the next move. He did not know exactly where 
the invitation had originated, nor did he think that there 
was much chance that a visit would lead to anything worth-
while. However, to refuse this move would have appeared to 
be an undiplomatic rebuff. If it were to become public 
knowledge this would hurt Britain in the eyes of the world 
and would also give Grey's domestic critics another item to 
use in calling for his resignation. In the end he had no 
choice but to make a guarded reply, which the inner cabinet 
supported. 13 
Whitehall decided to send Cassel directly to Berlin 
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with a memorandum prepared by Grey, which outlined 
Britain's basis for entering into talks. The memo read: 
1. Fundamental. Naval superiority as essential 
to Great Britain. German naval programme not to be 
increased, but if possible retarded and reduced. 
2. England sincerely desires not to interfere 
with German colonial expansion. To give effect to 
this she is prepared forthwith to discuss whatever the 
German aspirations in that direction may be. England 
will be glad to know that there is a field or special 
points where she can help Germany. 
3. Proposals for reciprocal assurances debarring 
either power from joining in aggressive designs Yi 
combinations against the other would be welcome. 
Bethmann-Hollweg conveyed his government's acceptance of 
the British conditions to Cassel, with a note of 
clarification stating that Germany would consider the 
Novelle to be part of her naval program. The chancellor 
then invited Edward Grey to visit Berlin as soon as would 
be practical. Cassel also brought back from Berlin an 
15 
outline of the new German supplement to the Naval Law. 
Upon receiving the reply from Berlin along with the 
sketch of the Novelle, the Admiralty quickly realized that 
Germany had in mind a large increase in her navy that in 
turn would require a large increase in the British naval 
program. Grey was informed that Britain would need to 
build approximately six additional capital ships in as many 
years, along with an increase in manpower approximately 
double that which Churchill had originally planned to ask 
Parliament for. The first lord mentioned that it might be 
necessary to "bring horne the Mediterranean battleships," in 
response to the German increases. He made it very clear 
that such an action would mean that France had to be 
counted on to protect British interests in the 
Mediterranean and that no "exchange of systems [the 
Entente] would be possible, even if desired by you." 16 
Churchill advised Grey that the only chance they had 
to prevent Britain from becoming directly dependent on 
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France and thereby preserve both freedom of action, and of 
course the entente, was to adopt the following course of 
action: 
They will announce their new programme, and we will 
make an immediate and effective reply. Then if they 
care to slow down the 'tempo' so that their fleet law 
is accomplished in twelve and not six years, friendly 
relations would ensue, and we, though I should be 
reluctant to bargain about it, could slow down too •••• 
Twelve years of tranquility would be a~9ured in naval 
policy. The attempt ought to be made. 
On February 3, a note drafted by Cassel, Churchill, 
Haldane, and Grey was sent to Ballin, which stated that 
Germany's naval increases made negotiations difficult, if 
not impossible. The note then went on to say, in the 
spirit of Churchill's aforementioned recommendations, that 
if Germany retarded the "tempo ••• so as to render any 
serious increase unnecessary" by the British government, 
then negotiations could begin so long as naval expenditures 
were open to discussion. If Germany agreed to this then 
Whitehall thought that the next step should be a "private 
and unofficial" visit by a British minister to Berlin. 
Lastly the note informed Berlin that Lord Haldane would be 
18 
sent, as opposed to Edward Grey. 
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The decision to send Haldane to Berlin arose from 
several considerations. Grey's pessimism in regard to the 
chances of success made him less than willing to go 
himself. If he were to go it would be impossible to hide 
the meetings, and public expectations would be unreasonably 
increased. Grey had no knowledge of the German language 
either. Haldane on the other hand could speak German and 
had a number of acquaintances in Berlin. He was on a 
commission with his brother that was charged with studying 
Germany's methods of scientific education. The two 
brothers could travel to Berlin under the pretext of their 
commission duties, and the press would take little notice 
of it. Haldane also had friends in Berlin who would enable 
him to be a better judge of whether or not a rapprochement 
'bl 19 was poss~ e. 
The Auswartiges Amt began developing a plan that would 
be satisfactory in Berlin, and hopefully in London too, 
several weeks prior to Haldane's arrival. Paul von 
Metternich pointed out that reinsurance against aggressive 
designs or combinations would be worthless, because of the 
difficulty in defining aggression. He argued that the 
elastic clause hinged on such wording should be dropped and 
instead an agreement should be drafted that prevented 
either power from making "combinations" or war against the 
other. This would prevent the Entente from being used 
against Germany and provide Great Britain with the security 
that it sought. From his vantage point in London 
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Metternich made perfectly clear, as he had for almost a 
decade, that Britain could not come to terms unless Germany 
compromised on the navy. 20 His apprehension about the 
interference in political matters by the navy was revealed 
in a private letter to Bethmann-Hollweg, in which he asked 
how much should be told to naval attache Widenmann. 21 
Bethmann-Hollweg, with the agreement of the Emperor, 
informed Metternich that the navy was not to be informed of 
the impending negotiations. The chancellor still did not 
know that London would accept the German's conditions for 
negotiations as of February 4; however, at this point he 
said that Germany would accommodate Britain's desires 
concerning the reduction in capital ship building tempo if 
a political agreement could be reached. 22 With the arrival 
of Haldane several days later, signifying that at least the 
fundamentals for an agreement might be possible, the 
difficult work of attempting a rapprochement began. 
Lord Haldane arrived in Berlin on Thursday February 8, 
1912, and met with Bethmann-Hollweg that same day. Haldane 
initiated the discussions "as arranged in a conversation I 
[Haldane] had with Sir Edward Grey before leaving London." 
He assured the chancellor that Britain was absolutely 
unbound by commitments to either France or Russia that were 
not public knowledge, yet Britain could not afford to let 
France be crushed. The military preparations that Haldane 
had personally overseen, in his capacity as minister of 
war, during the previous summer, were merely precautionary 
30 
and only intended to "bring the capacity of the British 
army in point of mobilisation to something approaching the 
standard which Germany had long ago reached." He naturally 
did not mention the military conversations that took place 
between London and Paris. 23 
Bethmann-Hollweg then stated that he found nothing at 
all wrong with Britain's preparations for self defense, nor 
did Germany seek to hamper the other state's freedom of 
action in such cases. He then brought up the subject of a 
neutrality formula, which he thought would help a great 
deal in settling the difficulties between the two states. 
The proposal was similar to what he had wanted as a 
political agreement since he had first become chancellor in 
1909. 24 
Haldane diplomatically replied that a simple 
neutrality formula was impractical for several reasons. A 
pledge of absolute neutrality would stop Britain from 
fulfilling its treaty obligations if Germany attacked 
Japan, Portugal, or Belgium. He argued that the same would 
be true if England were to attack Austria or grab 
strategically vital Denmark. Bethmann-Hollweg conceded the 
point to Haldane and went on to request a formula from the 
English lord. 25 
After rejecting the German proposal, Haldane initiated 
a conversation that demonstrated fairly clearly what London 
desired to have as a political understanding. He inquired 
whether an agreement "against aggressive or unprovoked 
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attacks and against all combinations, military and naval 
agreements, and plans directed to the purpose of aggression 
or unprovoked attack ••• " would be sufficient. The 
chancellor replied that "aggression and unprovoked attack" 
were difficult to define, but he would consider the matter 
and they could return to this question in their next 
. 26 
meet1ng. 
When the subject turned to the Novelle, Haldane made 
it clear that Britain could not come to any form of 
agreement with Germany unless the latter power compromised 
and reduced its naval buildup. Haldane stated that Britain 
planned to construct two vessels for each additional vessel 
that Germany constructed over its existing naval law. 
Bethmann-Hollweg replied, as did the Emperor and Admiral 
von Tirpitz during a meeting with Haldane the following 
day, that Germany had a vital and legitimate need for a 
third squadron. Because Germany was not willing to abandon 
the third squadron, which would free the other two 
squadrons from training duty, Bethmann-Hollweg asked for 
any ideas Haldane might have on how to reduce Germany's 
27 
naval plans and retain the new squadron. 
-Haldane answered in the spirit of Churchill's earlier 
recommendations that the tempo of Germany's new ship 
construction be retarded. He put forth the suggestion that 
Germany could plan to construct the three new vessels 
called for in the Novelle so that the final one would not 
be completed for about twelve years, instead of laying down 
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one new keel every other year and completing the last one 
in about seven years. The British minister also suggested 
in his meeting with Wilhelm II and Tirpitz, that if Germany 
were to drop one of the three additional ships, London 
could more readily negotiate on the political question. 
This type of concession was doubly important, because the 
British ministry was convinced, and rightfully so, that the 
other European powers would not take a political 
unde~standing between Germany and Great Britain seriously 
if at the same time they both were expanding their navies 
28 to protect themselves from each other. 
Tirpitz vehemently opposed any further reduction in 
construction for the third squadron. The number of new 
ships had already been slashed from six to three. Any 
further reduction was unacceptable to the navy's chief. 
The Emperor never abandoned the idea of slashing another 
ship from the program, but the center of discussions was 
switched back to the possibility of a reduction in building 
29 tempo. 
Haldane insisted that an agreement could not be 
inaugurated by the laying down of an additional vessel in 
1912. After much discussion, they tentatively agreed that 
Germany should lay down one of the additional capital ships 
called for in the Novelle during 1913, another in 1916, and 
the last in 1919. This meant that the last vessel was to 
be completed in approximately ten years. Tirpitz then 
asked Haldane to "give some undertaking about our own ship 
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building." The admiral stated that Germany could not 
recognize the two power standard, but Haldane refused to 
discuss a definition of standards of allocation. The three 
then came upon the idea that nothing about the navy be 
mentioned in an agreement, but as soon as a political 
understanding was reached the Emperor could announce that a 
new situation had arisen. Then without changing or 
abandoning the Novelle the government could slow the rate 
of construction to that already agreed to. 30 
The Emperor reminded Haldane that from Germany's 
perspective a political agreement was the key to 
everything. Haldane at this point seems to have agreed, as 
he reported to the British ambassador in Berlin Sir w. 
Edward Goschen. 31 The following day, Saturday, Bethmann-
Hollweg was to have a draft of a political understanding 
ready to present to Haldane. 
During meetings between Haldane and the chancellor on 
Friday evening and Saturday, the tentative proposals for a 
political understanding were arrived at. Bethmann-Hollweg 
presented a formal draft of an agreement with the vital 
crause being number three, which stated that if either of 
the powers became "entangled in a war with one or more 
other Powers, the other of the ••• parties will at least 
observe towards the Power so entangled a benevolent 
neutrality." 32 Haldane, in line with his earlier 
complaints against too binding of formula, stated that 
Britain could not agree to the German draft as it existed. 
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Before going further, Haldane's rebuttal of the 
original German draft should be examined more closely. 
Clause four of the German Draft stated that "the duty of 
neutrality which arises from the preceding article has no 
application, in so far as it may not be reconcilable with 
existing agreements •••• "33 Thereby, any existing defensive 
treaties that either Germany or Great Britain had were 
excluded from the German plan. This being the case, 
Haldane's concern could not have logically been for the 
safety of Japan, Portugal, or Belgium under such an 
arrangement; instead it was once again a fear that Germany 
might destroy France. Why Bethmann-Hollweg allowed Haldane 
to discredit the German formula in such an off-handed 
manner without further argument is not revealed in the 
existing record; however, it seems logical to assume that 
the chancellor saw no point in contesting the point because 
it was obvious that London would not accept his 
proposa1. 34 
After Haldane's rejection of the German formula, 
Bethmann-Hollweg informed him that the extremely elastic 
formula that Britain desired was inadequate too. Haldane 
then-proceeded to write out a new draft of the original 
German proposal that took into account the British 
complaints about the original. The major change took place 
in clause three, which then read: 
If either of the high contracting parties becomes 
entangled in a war in which it cannot be said to be 
the aggressor, the other wilr-at least-observe-rewards 
the Power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and 
use its utmost endeavour for the localisation of the 
conflict. 
Bethmann-Hollweg did not either accept or reject this new 
draft at this point. 35 
As the talks proceeded, Haldane returned to the 
subject of the Novelle. On Friday, he reported in his 
diary that he had a short talk with Wilhelm von Stumm of 
the German Foreign Office who told Haldane it would 
strengthen Bethmann-Hollweg's position if he made it 
absolutely clear that further naval concessions were 
necessary before London could come to a political 
35 
arrangement. This Haldane proceeded to do during his last 
talk with the chancellor. Bethmann-Hollweg replied that 
because 11 the question is of a political nature, the extent 
of the political agreement will be of decided importance ... 
This of course implies that if a suitable political 
understanding could be reached, then further naval 
reductions could also occur. 36 
After Haldane assured the chancellor that he wanted to 
go over all matters thoroughly before returning to 
London, 37 the two men then discussed some of the 
outstanding colonial and neocolonial problems that caused 
discord in the relations between the their two countries. 
Germany desired to settle the complications over the 
Baghdad Railway in a way that would allow German control of 
the Baghdad-Bussorah section with England having an 
11 exceptional position ... In return England then would allow 
German participation in any railroad ventures in southern 
Persia, and Germany would recognize England's political 
control of the area. Germany also pledged to assist 
England diplomatically in obtaining a concession from 
Turkey for a harbor in Kuwait. 38 
36 
In regard to Africa the discussions largely circulated 
around the secret treaty of 1898, which prepared for the 
possibility of the collapse of the Portugese African 
Ernpi~e. 39 Bethrnann-Hollweg stated that Germany desired to 
have islands of Zanzibar and Pernba in exchange for 
England's "special position" on the Baghdad Railway. In 
Africa the two thought that Germany could get the secret 
treaty amended to give Germany the part of lower Angola 
that had formerly been reserved for Britain. Bethrnann-
Hollweg then agreed that Britain should get the island of 
Timor, and if Germany should be able to work out a friendly 
arrangement with France and Belgium to get a section of the 
Lower Congo, England would then get the Katanga 
T . 1 40 r~ang e. 
This marked the end of Haldane's mission to Berlin. 
He left with the impression that the discussions had been 
valuable and the spirit of both parties had been friendly. 
Now carne the tasks of getting the two governments to accept 
the tentative arrangements and working out the details. 
Certainly the high hopes that both Haldane and 
Bethrnann-Hollweg shared at the conclusion of the meetings 
in Berlin did not mature as the weeks following the visit 
37 
showed. Why this was the case cannot be fully explained 
until an examination of the negotiations that followed is 
undertaken. However, a careful analysis of the situation 
to this point is in order. The memoirs written after the 
Great War by the key participants in the February 
discussions are of course suspect to a degree, but they do 
shed some light on the events. 
Haldane later records in his book, Before the War, 
that-he left Berlin with several grave concerns. First, it 
seemed certain that Germany was going to insist on keeping 
the Novelle. Second, there was much talk in Berlin that 
Tirpitz might be made chancellor, and finally, and perhaps 
of greatest concern, Germany had no clear direction to its 
foreign policy. He said that he never doubted the good 
intentions of Bethmann-Hollweg, or the Emperor for that 
matter, but that Tirpitz was becoming the real power in the 
41 German government. 
Tirpitz and Bethmann-Hollweg, although from very 
different perspectives, both argue against Haldane's first 
point in each of their post-war memoirs. Bethmann-Hollweg 
argues that the only way he could have regained control of 
the naval question in Germany was for there to be a 
noticeable reduction in the Revanche spirit brought on by 
Poincare's return to power in France. Probably the only 
way this could have been brought about was for Britain to 
have become openly more friendly toward Germany, thereby 
making the French uncertain as to whether or not Britain 
38 
would aid them if war came. 42 This argument is in keeping 
with the chancellor's statements to Haldane recorded above, 
which suggested that if a political arrangement was arrived 
at then further naval concessions could be forced past the 
big-navy advocates. Germany could obviously get by with a 
few ships less, if she only had to worry about the combined 
navies of the Franco-Russian Alliance, and not the Royal 
Navy. 
~irpitz states in his Memoirs that he "would have 
sacrif-iced the whole bill [Novelle] for a really solid 
agreement of neutrality, as I had let the Emperor know 
43 beforehand." Bethmann-Hollweg, who is depicted as a 
villain throughout the book, had not kept the admiral 
abreast on the political question so he never knew how 
great the possibility of an understanding was. Tirpitz 
claims that he "gave away" the third ship to Haldane after 
having already sacrificed the original plan for the 
Novelle. He mentions that it was certainly possible to 
give more ground later, so he did not want to capitulate 
until there was evidence of a real agreement being 
possible. A real agreement would have to have been either 
a political-neutrality agreement or a naval agreement based 
on a standard of two-to-three, instead of the two power 
standard, which Britain refused to abandon in principle. 44 
Tirpitz's argument is not entirely correct, but it 
needs to be considered. It was not true that the Tirpitz 
"gave away" the third ship called for in the Novelle during 
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Haldane's visit. He was correct in stating that Bethmann-
Hollweg did purposely try to keep the navy uninformed about 
the negotiations on political matters. It is also true 
that the admiral would have been satisfied with a naval 
agreement of a two to three ratio, as had been the case 
since 1909. 45 
This tends to at least partially support Haldane's 
final concern expressed above, that German policy had no 
clear direction. However, it was not so much that German 
policy had no identifiable direction, but that the German 
government was divided about how to achieve its policy 
goals. Both the chancellor and the Secretary of State for 
the Navy, feared the Entente might be used against Germany 
in an "aggressive" manner. Tirpitz thought that to 
compromise with Britain would make Germany look weak, and 
Britain did not come to terms with countries it did not 
fear to a substantial degree. The only way to deal with 
Britain was to continue to expand the Imperial Navy until 
London realized that Germany had to be dealt with in an 
honorable manner. 
Bethmann-Hollweg realized that a major reason that 
Britain continued to maintain its strong ties to the 
Entente Cordiale was because of the German naval buildup. 
It was probably true that in the cases of both France and 
Russia fear played a role in bringing Britain into an 
understanding with those powers. However, Russia's threat 
to India and France's threat to Britain's interests in the 
Mediterranean were insignificant in comparison to a threat 
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against Britain itself. A German navy large enough to have 
even a faint chance of nullifying the Royal Navy's control 
of the seas and quite close geographically to the United 
Kingdom was too great a threat to be discounted. The 
opposing issues for the chancellor became how to convince 
the government and the country that Germany should reduce 
its naval program while Britain was in the camp of 
Germany's opponents, and how to convince Britain it should 
distance itself from its Entente partners while Germany 
continued to build up its navy. The weeks following the 
Haldane Mission showed that there was not much compromise 
to come from either side of the North Sea. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESPONSES TO THE MISSION: 
CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM 
AND COLLAPSE 
_Following Haldane's departure from Berlin, 
Wilhelmstasse tempered its hopes that an agreement might 
finally be obtainable with a realization that Germany must 
be willing to compromise on the naval question. Haldane 
made it abundantly clear that Great Britain would only 
agree to a neutrality formula that was in fact a 
nonaggression pact, and even this was unlikely if Germany 
made any real increases in its navy within the next three 
years. This meant, in effect, that the Novelle had to be 
reduced to a shadow of its original intent. 1 
The political question, then, could be identified as 
the need to find a formula that actually reassured Germany 
that the Entente was not to be used aggressively, and, at 
the same time, flexible enough to allow Britain to sign it 
without giving up its good relations with France. 
Bethmann-Hollweg thought the British idea for a formula 
based on which side in a conflict was the aggressor was too 
narrow; the power that first declares war is not 
necessarily the aggressive one. A draft needed to be 
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found, while based on "aggression," that also took into 
consideration provocation by a third power. 2 Metternich 
believed that even if such a formula were found Britain 
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would not sign it unless the Novelle was dropped entirely. 
The chancellor still thought that a moderate increase to 
provide for a third squadron was acceptable to London. 3 
What was to be "acceptable increases" would be revealed 
soon. For the time being, the chancellor waited to find 
out London's reaction to the discussions that had just 
finished in Berlin. 
Whitehall's initial response to the tentative 
agreements discussed in Berlin was mixed. Immediately 
after Haldane's return to London, Grey informed Metternich 
that the results of the mission were impressive at first 
glance; of course, it required some time to go over them in 
detail. The foreign secretary stated that the spirit in 
which the talks were conducted, in and of itself, should 
4 help to relieve tension between the two powers. 
Among the permanent appointees in the Foreign Office 
and Ambassadors Goschen in Berlin and Bertie in Paris, the 
news from Berlin was not well received from the very start. 
Goschen opposed the compromise political formula even with 
addition of the "aggressor" clause, and thought that a 
reduction in building tempo by the German navy was not 
really a concession. He did believe that a construction 
slowdown was probably all that could be attained under the 
. t. . t t. 5 ex1s 1ng s1 ua 1on. 
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From his post in Paris, Bertie stated that the Haldane 
Mission was "a foolish move ••• to satisfy the Grey-must-go 
radicals." It created suspicion in Paris, and from this 
avid Francophile's position anything that might cause a 
cooling off of Anglo-French relations was undesirable. He 
was fearful that Britain might not give France proper 
consideration in any territorial arrangements and that 
Germany would not observe the "spirit" of any arrangement 
that-might be worked out. 6 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Sir Arthur Nicolson, after reviewing Haldane's compromise 
draft for a political agreement, decided that it was 
unacceptable. The terms "aggression" and "benevolent 
neutrality" were problematic, because there was no way to 
determine precisely the meanings the words would hold in 
unforeseen future events. The concerns he voiced over the 
term "aggression" were similar to those expressed in the 
Germany Foreign Office: "who is in reality the aggressor?" 
In regard to the phrase "benevolent neutrality" he argued 
that it is a contradiction in terms; if Britain was 
benevolent toward one party then it was not being truly 
7 
neutral. 
Nicolson concluded that clauses three and four and 
part of two (he did not state which part) should be omitted 
from the draft. He wanted part three omitted because of 
the above mentioned objections to the terminology and it, 
along with clause four, would cause Britain's "hands to be 
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tied" in the future. Four also allowed Germany to continue 
to maintain its ties with the Triple Alliance, while 
Britain would be precluded from making such arrangements 
with third powers. Therefor~, Nicolson wanted a political 
agreement that stated: 
The high contracting Powers assure each other 
mutually of their desire for peace and friendship. 
[unstated part of the following] 2. They will 
not either of them make any combination, or join in 
any combination, which is directed against the other. 
They declare expressly that they are not bound by any 
_such combination. 
5. The high contracting parties declare that 
they will, in the case of either of them having 
differences with third Powers, mutually give their 
diplomatic support for the purposes of settling their 
differences. 
Nicolson stated that even though this would make a very 
brief document, it would still be more than England had 
signed with any other European Great Power. 8 
Senior Clerk of the Foreign Office Eyre Crowe made 
broader comments on the Berlin discussions, but he too was 
not pleased with the tentative bargain. The assurances of 
the reduction in naval building tempo were to be given to 
the German Reichstag and not formally to Great Britain; 
therefore, it would be easy for the Berlin government to 
abandon the reduced tempo at any point it decided to. The 
only alternative to this was to sign a secret agreement 
between the two powers, but this would be some-thing that 
His Majesty's Government would probably not wish to do. 
Public opinion would be outraged if they found out that the 
government had signed another secret agreement without even 
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informing Parliament, especially after the recent 
controversies over the Entente agreements. Also, no major 
political faction would take a favorable view of any 
agreement that did not include a naval understanding. If 
there was to be any agreement it seemed that it would have 
to be almost purely political and have real advantages for 
Great Britain. In the colonial talks, Germany would need 
to make more concessions in order for Britain to go forward 
with_the colonial exchanges that Haldane had suggested to 
9 Bethmann-Hollweg. 
A matter that needs to be mentioned before proceeding 
with the examination of the negotiations between the two 
powers is Winston Churchill's famous, or perhaps infamous, 
"German luxury fleet" speech. While delivering an address 
in Glasgow on naval matters, during the exact time when 
Haldane was in Berlin, the First Lord remarked that while 
the Royal navy was vital to the very survival of Great 
Britain, the Imperial Navy was something of a "luxury" to 
Germany. Churchill later explained that "It appeared that 
the word 'luxury' had a bad significance when translated 
into German." Yet the outcry from the Liberal press in 
Britain, which occurred simultaneously with that from 
Germany, indicated that the speech had a bad connotation in 
English too. Churchill later argued quite unconvincingly 
that Haldane used the speech to good advantage while 
' d' . . B 1' 10 carry1ng on 1scuss1ons 1n er 1n. 
The significance of this was not so much what was 
said, aa when it was said. During the decade and a half 
prior to the war, politicians and naval officers on both 
sides of the North Sea constantly sniped at the opposing 
side's fleet programs; Churchill's speech was nothing new 
or particularly bombastic. But at a time when the two 
states were supposedly trying to achieve a rapprochement, 
it was certainly impolitic for a prominent member of the 
cabinet needlessly to risk angering the population of the 
othe~ state. It was now going to be even more difficult 
for those favoring compromise in Germany to have their 
11 
way. 
One of the main concerns that London had during its 
attempt to reach an understanding with Germany was an 
overriding desire to maintain friendly relations with 
France, which had been enjoyed over the previous eight 
years. Grey had been careful to keep both the French and 
Russian governments informed about the negotiations that 
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were taking place from the very start of the new round of 
12 talks. Several days after Haldane's return from Berlin, 
Grey reassured the French Ambassador in London Paul Cambon 
that a formal naval agreement might never be reached. 
Perhaps an agreement might be reached about an exchange of 
information or a reduced tempo of building, but this was 
likely to be a11. 13 Grey discovered in his conversations 
with Cambon that French treaties with Britain and Zanzibar 
were going to complicate the colonial discussions further 
still. Grey apparently did not go into any detail about 
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the political formula at this early stage. 14 
Nicolson met with Cambon on February 15, and the full 
weight of French fears about the renewed Anglo-German 
negotiations was revealed. Cambon claimed that Germany 
was hastening its military build up and trying to bind 
Britain so that it could not help France in a war--at this 
particular time for one reason in particular. The Russian 
army was in the middle of a reorganization and was not 
prep?red for war; therefore, with Britain neutralized by 
treaty and Russia by its current dis-organization, Germany 
would be able to "face a contest with France with 
equanimity." Cambon made one of the few diplomatic slips 
of his highly acclaimed career when he commented to 
Nicolson that Asquith was overly optimistic about reaching 
an agreement with Germany. The ministers involved were not 
terribly impressed by Cambon's argument, much less his 
questioning of the Prime Minister's understanding of the 
diplomatic situation, but they still continued to keep the 
15 French posted on developments as they progressed. 
In Paris, Bertie was actively working to subvert the 
aims of the Liberal government represented in the dispatch 
of Haldane to Berlin. Specifically, the ambassador prodded 
French Prime Minister Raymond Poincar~ into instructing 
Cambon to protest any agreement that mentioned neutrality 
under any circumstances. Cambon was to argue that France 
had given its military secrets to the British during the 
staff talks and the British army had a clear understanding 
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of French strategic planning. As it turned out Cambon 
never carried out his instructions, because Grey informed 
him that there was little if any chance of anything coming 
f th t . t' 16 o e nego 1a 1ons. 
The first major exchange of views between the 
representatives of Germany and Britain after Haldane's 
return to London occurred between Metternich, Grey, and 
Haldane on February 22. The British ministers told 
Metternich that the tentative agreements Haldane reached in 
Berlin were based on uncertain knowledge of the new German 
naval supplement; the minister of war only received a full 
copy of the law as he was leaving Berlin. Because he was 
not a naval expert, he probably would not have realized the 
significance of it even if he had the chance to read the 
full Novelle prior to his discussions with the 
17 
chancellor. 
Therefore, the naval question needed to be discussed 
in more detail. Haldane had not realized that the manpower 
increases called for in the law were important. Also, the 
decreased tempo that the Germans agreed to would still 
leave Britain in a position of having to lay down six 
additional capital ships over the next six to seven years. 
The British naval authorities had determined that the new 
fleet law demanded a much larger increase in the German 
navy than was required to have a training squadron to 
relieve the High Sea's Fleet of such duties. Germany could 
man the three new ships with 4000 men, and did not require 
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the 15,000 additional men called for. The British 
concluded that if the Germans were only making changes 
necessary for a training squadron, then something could 
more easily be worked out. This massive increase in 
manpower was in fact designed to keep about four-fifths of 
the German fleet in permanent full commission. The public 
in both countries would not understand increases of this 
magnitude, while at the same time the two countries are 
supposedly reaching a political understanding. 18 
In regard to the political agreement, Haldane repeated 
his former position that Britain could not agree to a 
neutrality formula that did not consider the problem of 
which party was the aggressor. The protestations of 
Metternich, and also of the British permanent secretaries 
about the difficulty of predetermining who was the 
aggressor did not seem to influence Haldane or Grey. The 
minister of war maintained that the value of Haldane's 
draft would be the spirit that it conveyed. 19 
In closing the meeting, the British ministers stated 
that the territorial questions also needed to be 
reevaluated. Grey argued that the German concessions on 
the Baghdad Railway were not enough to exchange for actual 
territory. He mentioned the fact that Zanzibar and Pemba 
could not be transferred without French involvement, and 
that the Dutch had prior rights to Timor ahead of 
B 't . 20 r~ a1n. Several days later the British ministry put 
forth the view that the increasingly complicated 
territorial talks might be better left until after the 
basic political and naval questions were resolved. 21 
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Haldane's argument that he did not comprehend the 
increases that the Novelle represented may have been true, 
but if so, his ignorance of the topic was inexcusable. 
Although the note Bethmann-Hollweg sent to London through 
Cassel and Ballin does not correspond exactly with the text 
of the 1912 Novelle, it was in fact a good outline of the 
actual bill. 22 Churchill fully realized that there was to 
be a major increase in the manpower requirements of the 
German fleet, after having examined the German outline of 
the bill on January 31. Churchill informed Grey on that 
same day that in addition to the meeting the German 
increases in capital ships, the Royal Navy had to meet the 
"German increase in personnel •••• I had intended to ask 
Parliament for 2000 more men this year and 2000 next. I 
23 
expect to double these quotas." 
After having seen the actual draft of the German law, 
the admiralty drew the same basic conclusions that it had 
after reviewing the outline sent by the German chancellor. 
The law would require Britain to increase its manpower by 
4000-men per annum, during the six-to-seven year course of 
the German law. This was just as Churchill had reported 
prior to Haldane's visit to Berlin. 24 
The type of reductions that Churchill thought possible 
prior to the Berlin discussions, as seen in Chapter II, 
required Germany to spread the naval law out over twelve 
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years. Under the Novelle the three additional battleships 
were to be spread over approximately six years, and the 
. . t k 1 . 25 1ncrease 1n manpower was to a e p ace over n1ne years. 
According to the discussions between Kaiser Wilhelm, 
Tirpitz, and Haldane, Germany was willing to reduce the 
building tempo so that the new construction would occur 
over about ten years. 26 Regardless of the fact that 
manpower was not seriously discussed, the fact that the 
slowing of the construction rate of capital ships 
necessitated a corresponding retardation of the personnel 
increases; the personnel increases would not be completed 
for about eleven to twelve years. In other words, Berlin 
had basically agreed with British desires that the Novelle 
be spread over twelve years, if a political agreement were 
reached. This does not include the fact that the Imperial 
government had not flatly rejected the idea of dropping one 
of the three additional capital ships and the corresponding 
number of men. 
The reasons for Haldane's not realizing the importance 
of the personnel increases in the German navy are not 
clear, but it does seem to be a fact. Perhaps Grey and 
Churchill simply did not know that Haldane was unaware of 
the significance of this part of the Novelle and therefore 
did not give him specific instructions in this regard. 
Perhaps on the other hand Haldane was briefed on the topic, 
and for some reason did not comprehend what he was told, or 
he simply forgot. Yet this seems improbable since Haldane 
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had been responsible for carrying out the military 
reorganization of the British army and should therefore 
have understood the significance of any Dldjor manpower 
increases. There is also the possibility that Haldane was 
simply not politically astute enough to comprehend the 
significance of the matters he discussed in Berlin; 
however, the existing record does not give the necessary 
information to explain adequately with whom the failure 
lay._ Whatever the reason, Haldane's ignoring this 
important part of the naval question represented a grave 
lack of communication within the British ministry and 
presented British policy with a problem that could have 
been easily avoided. 
The apparent rejection of much of the tentative 
arrangement worked out between Haldane and the German 
authorities by Whitehall and the Liberal Imperialists was 
not well received in Berlin. The Kaiser flamboyantly 
refused to accept any deviation from the arrangement that 
Tirpitz and he had made with the British minister; that is, 
at least, until some form of political agreement had been 
reached. Such a document would have to include some form 
of neutrality clause. 27 
Bethmann-Hollweg too believed that the British were 
backing away from much of what had tentatively been 
arranged in Berlin. Although the meetings were designed to 
establish a basis for agreements and not actually to 
conclude anything definite, the German government naturally 
assumed that Haldane expressed the opinions of his 
colleagues. The chancellor viewed the preliminary 
discussions to have produced a consensus along the 
following lines: (1) some form of political agreement, 
which included a neutrality clause, was to be signed and 
afterwards followed by a slow-down in the tempo of 
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battleship construction by the German navy, (2) the secret 
treaty of 1898, was to be modified so that Germany would 
have_prior claim to the zone that had formerly been 
reserved for Great Britain in Angola, and England was to 
assist Germany in gaining part of the Belgian Congo, (3) a 
transfer of Zanzibar and Pempa to Germany was not 
objectionable to Britain and (4) Germany was willing to 
give up claim to Timor if Britain wanted it, and also grant 
Britain a special position (Berucksichtigung) on the 
Baghdad Railway. 28 
The chancellor stated that he was still prepared to 
carry on negotiations on the political agreement on the 
basis of the discussions between himself and Haldane. The 
political agreement, which still was the most important 
part of the discussions in his thought, would determine the 
outcome of the naval and colonial negotiations. The fact 
that he was willing to continue the political discussions 
along the line that had come out of the Berlin discussions 
indicates that he had become reconciled in principle to the 
inclusion of an "aggressor" clause into the proposed 
neutrality section of a treaty. The problem still remained 
one of the actual wording of a formula that would give 
Germany the security that it sought. 29 
Metternich discussed the existing situation with the 
British Lord President of the Council, Viscount John 
Morley, on February 29. Morley argued that the Liberal 
ministry would look foolish if it ceded territory to 
Germany at a time when German naval expansion forced 
Britain to increase its naval expenditures. Metternich 
replied in light of the Chancellor's comments expressed 
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above that Germany had expected that what Haldane had said 
in Berlin was in keeping with the cabinet's position. He 
said that it now seemed that Britain was trying to back out 
of the talks. Morley emphatically denied this, leading 
Metternich to conclude that even the colonial discussions 
should continue so long as Berlin was willing to compromise 
on th 1 t . 30 e nava ques 1on. 
In Germany the forces both inside and outside of the 
government advocating an increase in the navy were stepping 
up their efforts to push through the Novelle. Tirpitz set 
out, item by item, to discredit the British complaints 
about the bill to the Kaiser and push for its introduction 
to the Reichstag. His argument basically stated that the 
Novelle was not as drastic as the British were 
1 . . 31 c a1m1ng. The German Naval attache in London, Captain 
Widenmann, put forth the fanciful claim that Britain could 
not stand the cost of building two ships for every one that 
Germany built. He then drew the conclusion that since the 
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ratio would remain approximately two to three regardless of 
whether the Novelle is adopted or not, Germany should 
therefore go ahead with the bill. 32 The two naval officers 
apparently ignored the political consequences of the bill 
even when it was quite apparent that the overall strength 
of the two powers' navies were going to remain the same 
anyway. 
The protestations of the chancellor could not stand 
critical examination by the Kaiser and most within the 
government until some acceptable form of political 
arrangement was reached. Whether the British admiralty was 
right and the Novelle would make four-fifths of the German 
fleet in permanent full commission, or if the German 
admiralty was right and three-fourths of the navy was to be 
kept in that state of readiness was of no real consequence 
in the chancellor's mind. Britain could and would expand 
its navy approximately twice as much as Germany did, and 
th h t b . 33 e c anges were o e maJor. 
On February 29, Haldane informed Metternich that the 
Royal Navy was planning to transfer the Mediterranean 
squadron home in reply to the German Novelle. The ministry 
thought that public opinion would demand it, even if the 
navy did not think it was necessary. Upon receiving word 
of this, the Kaiser became quite irate. He then ordered 
the foreign office to instruct Metternich to tell Grey that 
if such a transfer took place, Germany would regard it as a 
casus belli (Kriegsfall). Germany would then return to the 
60 
original Novelle, calling for six additional battleships in 
six years, and mobilization. 34 
Instead of complying with the Kaiser's coarse 
directive, Bethmann-Hollweg sent a memorandum to London 
that dealt specifically with the negotiations and made no 
mention of the proposed transfer of the Mediterranean 
fleet. Wilhelm then proceeded to address a letter directly 
to Metternich ordering him to tell Grey that such a 
transfer would mean a return to the original plan for the 
Novelle, and eventual mobilization. He did back away from 
stating that the redeployment was a cause for war. 35 
The action by the Kaiser in sending a message to an 
ambassador and not through the chancellor brought about a 
short crisis in German government. Bethmann-Hollweg 
informed the Emperor that his actions were unsupportable 
both on political and constitutional grounds. On March 7, 
the chancellor submitted his resignation and waited for 
developments. After weighing the situation, the Kaiser 
backed down. Bethmann-Hollweg retained his position and 
continued to try to work out an understanding with Great 
Britain, but now from a somewhat more solid domestic 
position. Metternich never delivered the warning to the 
British foreign office; however, the need to gain more room 
to compromise on the naval question remained as elusive as 
36 
ever. 
The British ministry received with disquiet reports 
from Germany of the growing agitation for the naval 
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supplement. The news tended to reinforce the view that the 
German government was divided on the questions dealing with 
Great Britain and the navy. It seemed that the Kaiser, 
chancellor, and the State Secretary of Finance Wermuth all 
favored some form of understanding with Britain, while the 
navy and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Kiderlen-Waechter did not. But it did seem that the naval 
staff officers did have a great deal of influence over the 
. 37 Ka1ser. 
The permanent secretaries in the British foreign 
office were quite skeptical about certain parts of the 
reports coming from Berlin. Crowe maintained that it was 
absurd to think that the naval agitation could be traced to 
anyone except the Kaiser. He refused to believe that there 
was any real division in the German government and that 
Wilhelm ultimately controlled the press. He reflected 
views that, if the names of the countries were reversed, 
would fit Tirpitz quite well. In good cold war rhetoric 
the Assistant Under-Secretary concluded that "good 
relations with Germany are to be had by any Power with 
which she is afraid to go to war, and by no other." 38 This 
type-of reasoning was quite well adapted to Nicolson, but 
Haldane and Grey still tended to understand that the German 
government was indeed not a united one, and there were 
fissures that could be exploited. 39 
On March 6, Metternich conveyed a memorandum from 
Wilhelmstrasse to Whitehall that did show some sign of a 
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willingness to compromise, but also reflected a degree of 
resentment over what appeared in Germany as a rejection of 
the Haldane mission discussions. The memorandum (drafted 
by Bethmann-Hollweg) stated that Germany was prepared to 
"refrain from indicating at present ctny year for the 
construction of the third [battle] ship," the suggestion 
being that the third ship might not be constructed at all. 
This was put forth in the hope that Britain might present 
Germany with a proposal for a political agreement that both 
sides could agree on. German policy did still preclude any 
commitment on its part to place a ceiling on its armaments 
prior to arranging for German security through political 
40 
agreement. 
The memorandum included a discussion of the colonial 
talks, as Bethmann-Hollweg understood them, that took place 
in Berlin, but it was clear from the document that they 
were of secondary consideration. He had also been the one 
to suggest to Haldane during the latter's visit that 
perhaps the colonial discussions should be delayed until 
after the political and naval questions had been reviewed 
by London. Ha~dane had stated that he knew the situation 
well·enough to talk over all of the outstanding 
. 41 quest~ons. 
Erye Crowe, as the most outspoken critic of Germany in 
Whitehall, based his critique of the German communication 
on what Germany considered to be by far of least 
importance, colonies. He argued that it was dishonorable 
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to help Germany acquire anything from third powers and 
placed the blame for even discussing the matter squarely on 
Wilhelmstrasse. Both honor and treaty obligations required 
Britain to stop discussing these possibilities. "I am 
afraid all our experience goes to prove that this is the 
way not to get better, but to get a perpetuation of worse, 
relations."42 On the other hand, perhaps the way to 
improve relations would have been to 1liscuss the issues 
that_were of vital importance, instead of offering "bribes" 
and then becoming indignant when Germany was interested in 
k . h 43 ta 1ng t ern. 
From his more secure position in the Government, 
Bethmann-Hollweg renewed his efforts to reach a political 
understanding with Britain. At this point he accepted in 
principle the draft for an agreement that Haldane had 
produced prior to leaving Berlin. The chancellor concluded 
that even though "~gsression" is a vague term, if both 
states swore against it then the parties that existed in 
both countri~a who constantly saw the threat of attack from 
the other side would be sil&nced. On the other hand, if 
Britain refused to sign a neutrality agreement, based on an 
aggressor clause, then many in Germany would view London as 
having initiated talks simply to frustrate the passage of 
the Novelle. 44 
In accepting Haldane's draft for an agreement, 
Bethmann-Hollweg required an addition that called for 
action by the other partner in Ci treaty if one were the 
victim of provocation. He did this in reaction to 
Haldane's assertion that his government sought a formula 
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that did not require Britain to stand aside if Germany "did 
eat up France." But also, London wanted the formula to be 
one that told France that it could not count on British 
h 1 ' ' ' Al L ' 45 e p 1n rega1n1ng sace- ora1ne. 
On March 12 the chancellor informed Metternich that 
the Novelle had not yet been submitted to the Reichstag and 
that-there was still some time left to reach an under-
standing with Britain on the armaments question. Berlin 
had complied with what it had thought Churchill and Haldane 
had sought in regard to the Novelle. He then requested 
Metternich to find out if the discussions and information 
given during the Haldane mission was the position of the 
British government. If it were not, then it should be 
known so that the misunderstandings that had occurred over 
46 the previous weeks could be cleared up. 
Metternich replied that it appeared Haldane had gotten 
carried away in Berlin by the thrill of getting things 
settled. The British government unanimously agreed that he 
should never have offered Zanzibar and Pemba in exchange 
for Timor. With the Novelle, the Liberal ministry could 
not agree to much of a political arrangement, and the 
government's need for Conservative support only compounded 
th . 47 1S. 
On the evening of March 12, the final attempt to work 
out a naval-political agreement on the basis of the Berlin 
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talks began. Metternich sent a message to Lord Haldane 
asking to see him immediately, and he arrived at the German 
Embassy just before eleven P.M. The British minster was 
informed that Wilhelmstrasse had instructed Metternich to 
inform Whitehall that if a satisfactory political agreement 
could be presented to Germany, the Novelle would be 
withdrawn. It then had to be replaced by another, but the 
new one was 
4q to be substantially reduced. ·' 
_Metternich was not able to answer any specific 
questions as to the nature of the changes that could be 
made. He did say though that besides the concessions 
agreed to in Berlin, Germany was willing to reduce 
personnel. The British political formula was to be 
considered conditional on London's being satisfied with the 
reductions made. The Ambassador concluded by saying that 
time was of the essence, because Bethmann-Hollweg would 
need to make a statement about the Novelle before the 
Reichstag in a short time. 49 
After Haldane conversed with other members of the 
inner cabinat and the permanent secretaries at Whitehall, 
Nicolson began the drafting of a formula for presentation 
to Germany. Nicolson proposed to "do my utmost to find a 
formula we may submit which will be of as noncommittal a 
character as possible, and one which will not bind our 
h d · d t l"t" "50 an s ~n regar to any even ua ~ ~es •••• The formula 
that he and Grey produced was nothing if it was not 
noncommittal. 
On the Fourteenth, Grey presented his draft to 
Metternich. It reads as follows: 
England will make no unprovoked attack upon 
Germany and pursue no aggressive policy towards her. 
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Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and 
forms no part of any Treaty understanding or 
combinations to which England is now a party nor will 
she bec~fe a party to anything that has such an 
object. 
Metternich immediately informed the foreign minister 
that his proposal was insufficient. The central point to 
the ~Conceivable Draft" that Haldane produced in Berlin was 
the third clause, especially the inclusion of the term 
"neutrality." The ambassador then proposed that Grey's 
draft be amended by the clause "England will therefore as a 
matter of course remain neutral if a war is forced upon 
Germany." 
Grey replied that the statement as it existed 
expressed the British position correctly. London feared 
that if it "tied its hands" and Germany crushed France, 
then Britain may one day have to fight Germany alone. 
Britain had made no commitment to France and the military 
conversations between the tw.o states had only been held in 
order to be prepared for unforeseeable circumstances. Grey 
stated that "On the other hand, I had given France clearly 
to understand that, if France was aggressive towards 
Germany or attacked Germany, no support would be forth-
corning from us." Thus Grey did not want to sign a more 
binding agreement, because it might give the impression 
that more was meant than was actually said on paper. 52 
The proposed British formula did conform to British 
policy, but Grey's explanation of it does not give a full 
representation of that policy. To be sure, Britain would 
not support open French aggression against Germany, but 
what would happen if France and Russia entered a war 
against Germany and France began to lose the war? 
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Britain's basic position, that it could not afford to allow 
France to be crushed and no longer be a great power, would 
not have changed regardless of which side started the war. 
Therefore, London could promise not to participate in any 
aggressive plans or combinations against Germany, but to 
promise neutrality in such an event would possibly allow 
Germany to have too much latitude in dealing with a 
defeated France. 
Bethmann-Hollweg realized that the English formula 
precluded Britain from attacking Germany; however, it did 
not prevent "the participation of England in hostilities 
against Germany in the case of a Franco-Russian attack, 
[this] could not effectively relieve the world crisis." He 
argued after the war that Grey's rejection of Metternich's 
proposed amendments only make sense if Whitehall believed 
that·it must consider the "forcing of a war by the friends 
of England, and if he [Grey] held himself bound ••. ~o give 
his support to the Allied Powers."53 The chancellor was 
incorrect in that he inferred that Britain was bound to 
France, but in fact at the time of the Haldane mission 
Britain could easily have remained neutral at the start of 
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any war that France provoked. What Grey was bound to was 
the British policy that demanded the preservation of France 
as a counter balance to Germany. Thus Grey was tied to his 
perception of Britain's interest, not to France. 
As the meeting in which Met1ernich proposed amendments 
to the British formula drew to a conclusion, the ambassador 
handed Grey a copy of a new draft formula that Bethmann-
Hollweg had written. The document was almost identical to 
that_which Haldane had written in Berlin, with the 
exception of the critical clause three which now read: 
If either of the high contracting parties becomes 
entangled in a war with one or more powers in which it 
can not be said to be the aggressor, the other of the 
high contracting parties will at least observe towards 
the power so entangled a benevolent neutrality and use 
its utmost endeavour for the localisation of the 
conflict. If either of the high contracting parties 
is forced to go to war by obvious provocation from a 
third party they bind themselves to enter into an 
exchange g4 views concerning their attitude in such a 
conflict. 
This clnuse clearly shows that Bethmann-Hollweg did 
accept the principle of neutrality being contingent upon 
which side in a conflict was the aggressor. The second 
sentence, which was the addition to Haldane's original 
"conceivable draft," was designed to bridge the gap over 
the difficulty of defining the term, "aggressor." In 
consulting each other, in the event of "obvious 
provocation," the power not directly involved in a war 
could at least listen to the position of the power that was 
claiming to be the victim of provocation. 
The importance of the "new draft" rests in the fact 
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that each country would still be free to interpret for 
itself which party in a war was the aggressor. The only 
way that this document could "tie the hands" of Great 
Britain was if, for example, France made an attack on 
Germany in the most blatant and unprovoked fashion. If 
there was to be even a relatively minor crisis preceding 
such a war, it would have been quite easy for Britain tu 
obscure the facts, if necessary, and declare Germany to be 
the aggressor. Were Germany to execute the Schlieffen 
plan, the violation of Belgian neutrality would release 
Britain from the confines of clause three, as was shown 
above, because Germany would naturally be the aggressor and 
also clause four exempts previous treaties from the pledge 
contained in clause three. 55 
In the post-war memoirs written by several key cabinet 
ministers, the two possible formulas that Germany would 
have agreed to are largely misrepresented. Asquith states 
that Bethmann-Hollweg's formula would "have precluded us 
from corning to the help of France, should Germany on any 
pretext attack her, and aim at getting the Channel 
ports."56 This was of course true of the Chancellor's 
original formula presented to Haldane, but it was certainly 
not true of either the Grey formula, as amended by 
Metternich, or the "new draft" written by Bethmann-Hollweg. 
Grey later reminisced that political formulas were simply 
not safe and that a naval ngreement could not be obtained; 
thereby, he omitted the possibility of the Novelle's 
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alteration and avoided having to explain the various 
57 formulas. Haldane simply states that the chancellor did 
not commit himself to the "conceivable draft" during the 
former's visit to Berlin. He carefully avoided menticning 
the "new draft" that did include the modifications the 
British minister had suggested. 58 
In the days following the delivery of the British and 
German drafts for a political agreement, Bethmann-Hollweg 
work~<l diligently, and for a time successfully, to postpone 
the introduction of the Novelle to the Reichstag. He 
reminded the Kaiser that only the previous June the 
admiralty had stated that the existing naval law was 
I:{Ufficient. It was only through what the Imperial 
~uvernment now knew were misunderstandings during the 
summer of 1911 that the need for an expansion of the navy 
appeared necessary. If Germany waited a short time longer 
and was willing to compromise on the naval question, 
possibly something positive could be worked out with 
Britain. Also, if Germany revealed the Novelle now, 
. . ld 1 . . t . lt 59 Br1ta1n wou sure y v1ew 1 as an 1nsu • 
The strengthened position that the chancellor 
temporarily enjoyed in Berlin did not go unnoticed in 
London, but Ud ·'=' c~i d not bring any change in at. ti tude 
there. Goschen commented that it appeared that Bethmann-
Hollweg had finally gotten ahead of Tirpitz. Yet he 
confessed that it seemed unlikely that this would mean a 
real poss~bility of arms redu~tions, since if that occurred 
Tirpitz would threaten to ~~sign and there was no one 
qualified to replace him. 60 Grey concluded that despite 
the chancellor's stn:l.gthened position, there was little 
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Britain could do to insure his success and that they could 
not make an agreement with this one person; Bethmann-
Hollweg could be removed from office at any time. 61 
The chancellor reminded Grey, through Metternich, that 
the person of the Kaiser was the guarantee of the 
continuity of German policy. The chancellor reiterated 
that he "could recommend ••• to give up the essential parts 
of the Novelle ••• only if we could conclude an agreement 
guaranteeing neutrality of a far reaching character •••• " 
This position had nothing to do with personalities. 62 
Grey inquired whether the chancellor was then asking 
for an agreement that amounted to absolute neutrality. 
Metternich replied, according to Grey, that "the chancellor 
had not used the word 'absolute,' but in effect his wish 
amounted to that." The ambassador then confirmed that 
without an agreement that was in fact a pledge of absolute 
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neutrality the Novelle must proceP0. 
Metternich's statements are difficult to reconcile 
with·a number of other facts. Certainly the "new draft" 
that the chancellor had sent to London did not call for 
"absolute neutrality." Even the proposed amendments that 
Metternich h~d ddvanced in regard to Grey's proposal left 
Britain in the position to decide for itself if "war is 
forced on Germany." This is not to argue that if Britain 
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did sign either of the versions that were acceptable to 
Germany, that London would not be making a marked change in 
policy; however, both formulas did provide legitimate means 
of escape if Germany did pursue a belligerent policy. 
Perhaps Metternich was trying to increase German demands 
and thereby have more room to compromise later; again it is 
impossible to say with certainty. 
After it became apparent that Britain would not 
subst2nti~lly revise its proposed political agreement, 
Metternich informe~ Grey that Berlin still considered the 
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"new draft" acceptable. Grey soon rejected this too~ 
stating that this formula ~ould lead to a number of 
different interpretations. He noted that Britain did not 
have any such far reaching agreement with either France or 
Russia. Metternich retorted that such a neutrality 
agreement with France and Russia would be superfluous since 
Britain would probably side with these two countries in the 
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event of war. 
This impasse in regard to the politjcal formula 
effectively marked the end of the possibility of reaching a 
politically meaningful understanding between Germany and 
Great Britain. Although there were to be intermittent 
attempts to reach an agreement before the outbreak of the 
war, nothing could really be accomplished in the political 
realm without one of the two countries making a fundamental 
shift in policy. Thus the real effect of the Haldane 
mission proved to be little more than a medium for 
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1 . · that each state adopted and clarifying the po ~c~es 
continued to hold until the final collapse of 1914. 
With the final rejection of the political formulas at 
the end of March 1912, Germany and Great Britain continued 
to seek security for themselves in the same manners that 
had origindlly produced the feelings of insecurity and 
soured relations during the preceding decade. Germany 
passed the naval supplement on June 14, 1912, clinging to 
the risk theory despite the increasing evidence that it was 
no longer relevant (if it ever had been) to an 
international-political system based on power groups 
instead of individual powers. Britain in the name of 
keeping a "free hand" politically, tied itself more closely 
than ever to France through the Mediterranean-North Sea 
naval exchange. In both Berlin and London the events of 
the Winter of 1912, served only to prove to each side Whdt 
they had been saying all along; the other side was trying 
66 to upset the balance of power. 
Of course, the fact remains that neither the Imperial 
nor Royal governments was willing to compromise enough to 
lay even the groundwork for ending the antagonism that had 
developed over the preceding decades. Yet, the powers' 
inability to reach an understanding on the naval and 
political questions merely reflected the divergent 
interests of the two states on more fundamental grounds. 
Germany geographically lay between two states that were 
tied by a military alliance and so long as Britain was not 
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willing to clarify its relationship with the Dual Alliance, 
Berlin could never agree to anything that restricted its 
freedom of action .in procuring armaments. Because Britain 
retained complete freedom to decide on political matters, 
Berlin too must be free to arrange its own armaments 
policy. The irony of this, at least from the German 
perspective, is that the naval race continually pushed 
Britain toward France and may be held responsible for the 
naval exchange of 1912, which bound the Entente as tightly 
as any alliance treaty could have. 
From the position of the Liberal ministry in London, 
it seemed equally incredible that Germany should ask that 
Britain not interfere in a war in which Genr!0.ny r:ould bring 
about a radical alteration of the balance of power, and ask 
that Britain abandon its policy of maintaining a two power 
naval standard. Who started a general European war was not 
the main concern with which London had to deal. The main 
question was how to prevent Germany from becoming so strong 
as to dominate the continent. As with Germany, the 
measures that Britain took to prevent the realization of 
its most feared possibility, had the effect of prodding 
Germany to take f:;teps that did threaten the balance. 
As things worked out the powers both passed a chance 
to form a "bridge" between the two power groups through an 
Anglo-German rapprochement. Grey recognized the advantage 
that could be gained if one power from each side reached an 
agreement on major outstanding issues. He told Metternich 
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that it would be welcomed news if Austria and Russia were 
to arr5ve at a far-reaching agreement that prevented war in 
Balkans. "Such an agreement would not make separate 
groups, for it would bring together two Powers which 
belonged to different groups." Grey argued that in time 
such an event "would have a good influence," by preventing 
a general war from erupting over a small dispute in the 
Balkans. 67 
_London was not willing to take the risk of being a 
part of the "bridge" between the two power groups. Had the 
British cabinet accepted the idea of a neutrality pledge on 
the condition that the party to the agreement was not the 
aggressor, London would have held a key position between 
France and Germany. Paris could not afford to take any 
action that might make Britain decide France was provoking 
a war because then Britain would remain neutral. Berlin 
could likewise ill afford to take any action that Britain 
may interpret as provocative; Lonoon would then surely join 
France in a war against Germany. Even if France and 
Britain drifted apart over the signing of an Anglo-German 
agreement, it is difficult to see how such an arrangement 
could have been more dangerous to peace and the balance of 
power than to continue to do nothing as Europe slid toward 
war. 
If any degree of acceptance is to be placed in the 
idea that Germany had virtually become the prisoner of 
Austrian ambitions by 1914, then one must consider how an 
Anglo-German rapprochement would have affected this. 
Berlin certainly would be less likely to issue "blank 
checks" in order to preserve its sole faithful ally. 
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Britain could serve as a second country that Germany could 
rely on to some degree; thus Austria's influence on 
Berlin's policy would have decreased. 
Prior to April 1912, war was not a scheme seriously 
contemplated by either party. Although "Copenhagening" of 
the German fleet was discussed in the British Admiralty, 
there is no evidence to support the idea that the 
responsible ministers ever contemplated such an act of 
naked aggression. The same situation is true of Germany, 
at least up to the collapse of the Haldane mission 
t , t, 68 nego ~a ~ons. As Winston Churchill and more recently 
Paul Kennedy have argued, the naval race and occasional 
naval scares along with the Moroccan crises were of the 
nature of a "cold war." Any shooting war would require a 
f t t . b f th t 'd 69 ar grea er provoca ~on y one o e wo Sl es. 
The way the Anglo-German relationship progress~d up to 
July 1914 supports the idea that'these two states would not 
be the first to enter into a European war. Despite their 
difficulties, London and Berlin had finally worked out an 
agreement on the Bashdad Railway and tensions between the 
two had relaxed notably just in time for the Great War to 
destroy these gains. Perhaps the two states could have 
avoided war indefinitely if the rest of the European 
situation had not been so explosive. The antagonism that 
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had arisen by 1912 between Germany and Great Britain did, 
however, have the effect of all but insuring that if a 
general European war did erupt, then these two states would 
both be involved and on opposite sides. The lack of 
political compromise between London and Berlin adequately 
demonstrates the unease and distrust between the two, but 
does not explain it. 
The statesmen who sat in Berlin and London were 
neither diabolical war mongers nor saints. They were often 
largely captives of systems that they neither created, nor 
controlled to any significant extent. The underlying 
causes of the tension between Germany and Great Britain 
largely resulted from the ever increasing Pconomic rivalry 
between the two nations. The constant quest for new 
markets and sources of raw materials, whether by gaining 
more territory or through comm~rcial penetration, 
continually brought the subjects of King George and Kaiser 
Wilhelm into conflict~ Thus it is logical to conclude that 
the behavioral and motivational differences between 
"liberal" Britain and "conservative" Germany were not as 
great as many historians have argued. The competitive 
nature of these two countries• economic systems would 
continue to act as a deterrent to a rapprochement between 
London and Berlin until the final breakdown of August 1914. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE SHOWING COMPARATIVE NAVAL 
STRENGTHS OF SELECTED POWERS 
AND COMBINATION~ OF POWERS 
1) ~attleships not more than fifteen years old from the 
date of launch and battle cruisers. 
2) Dreadnought type battleships, or battle cruisers 
completed. 
3) Armoured cruisers not more than fifteen years old from 
the date of launch. 
4) Dreadnought type battleships, or battle cruisers under 
construction, or projected (the Triple Alliance powers 
normally made longer range projections on naval 
construction than did Great Britain). 
March 1907: 
Great Britain 
Germany 
France/Russia 
Triple Alliance 
March 1908: 
Great Britain 
Germany 
France/Russia 
Triple Alliance 
March 1909: 
Great Britain 
Germany 
France/Russia 
Triple Alliance 
March 1910: 
Great Britain 
Germany 
France/Russia 
Triple Alliance 
( 1 ) 
47 
21 
23 
34 
( 1 ) 
40 
21 
21 
36* 
( 1 ) 
46 
22 
18 
40* 
( 1 ) 
48 
24 
17 
43* 
89 
( 2) 
l 
0 
0 
0 
( 2) 
1 
0 
0 
0 
( 2) 
5 
0 
0 
0 
( 2) 
8 
3 
0 
3 
(3) 
30 
6 
19 
15 
( 3 ) 
34 
8 
20 
16* 
( 3 ) 
38 
8 
21 
16 
( 3 ) 
38 
9 
20 
18 
( 4) 
6 
6 
0 
7* 
( 4) 
9 
10 
1 
15* 
(4) 
7 
14 
4 
19* 
(4) 
12 
11 
4 
17* 
March 1911: ( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3 ) ( 4) 
Great Britain 47 12 38 15 
Germany 26 4 10 12 
France/Russia 16 0 21 6 
Triple Alliance 43 4 20 20 
March 1912: ( 1) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4) 
Great Britain 47 16 34 16 
Germany 28 9 9 14 
France/Russia 20 6@ 23 14 
Triple Alliance 45 9 18 24 
January 1913: ( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3 ) ( 4) 
Great Britain 52 22 34 14 
Germany 31 13 8 10 
France/Russia 20 6@ 23 18 
Trip~e Alliance 48 15 17 18 
January 1914: ( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3 ) ( 4) 
Great Britain 51 27 34 15 
Germany 35 17 8 9 
France/Russia 22 8@ 30 21 
Triple Alliance 53 20 16 16 
*Approximately. Austrian naval estimates were not 
included in British naval reports until 1911. 
@The abrupt change in the number of Dreadnought type 
battleships placed in the France/Russia column is due to 
the fact that British naval estimates did not consider the 
French Danton class Battleship to be a Dreadnought type 
prior to the 1912 estimates. 
Appendix I was compiled from information found in 
Ernest L. Woodward's book Great Britain and the German 
Navy (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935),-Appendix I. The 
Austrian figures that are added to Woodward's figures to 
make up the total Triple Alliance estimates for 1907-1910 
were taken from Anthony L. Sokol's work The Imperial and 
Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy (Annapolis: United States 
Naval Institute, 1968). 
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APPENDIX B 
PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL FORMULAS 
CONSIDERED BY GREAT BRITAIN AND 
GERMANY DURING WINTER, 1912 
First suggestion by Bethmann-Hollweg to Lord Haldane during 
the latter's visit to Berlin: 
The high contracting Powers assure each other mutually 
of their desire for peace and friendship. 
2. They will not either nf them make any combination, 
or join in any combination, which is directed against the 
other. They declare expressly that they are not bound by 
any such combination. 
3. If either of the high contracting parties becomes 
entangled in a war with one or more other Powers, the other 
of the high contracting parties will at least observe 
towards the Power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and 
use its tltrnost endeavour for the localisation of the 
conflict. 
4. The duty of neutrality which arises from the 
preceding article has no application, in so far as it may 
not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the high 
contracting parties have already made. The making of new 
agreements which make it impossible for either of the 
contracting parties to observe neutrality towards the other 
beyond what is provided by the preceding limitations, is 
excluded in conformity with the provisions contained in 
article 2. 
5. The high contracting parties declare that they 
will, in the case of either of them having differences with 
third Powers, mutually give their diplomatic support for 
the purposes of settling their differences.@ 
Thi.s is the "Sketch of a Conceivable Formula" that Haldane 
brought back to London after his meetings in Berlin 
(underlines are mine and represent alterations from the 
origninal proposal by Bethmann-Hollweg): 
91 
The high contracting Powers assure each other mutually 
of their desire for peace and friendship. 
2. They will not, either of them, make any unprovoked 
attack upon the other or join in any combination ££ design 
against the dther for purposes of aggression, 9E become 
party to ~ plan ££naval or ~ilitary combination alone or 
in conjunction ~ith ~ other Power directed to such an 
end. 
3. If either of the high contracting parties becomes 
entangled in a war in which it cannot be said to be the 
Aggressor, the other will at-reast observe towards-t~ 
Power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its 
utmost endeavour for the localisation of the conflict. 
_4. The duty of neutrality which arises from the 
preceding article has no application in su far as it may 
not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the high 
contracting parties have already made. The making of new 
agreements which render it impossible for either uf tbe 
high contractir1g parties to observe neutrality towards the 
others [sic : other] beyond what is provided by the 
preceding limitation is excluded in conformity with the 
provision contained in article 2. 
5. The high contracting parties declare that they 
will do all in their power to prevent differences and 
misunderstanding between either of them and other POWers.@ 
This is the "New Draft for an Anglo-German Agreement" which 
was sent to London on March 12 and conveyed to Grey, by 
Metternich on March 15: 
1. The high contracting powers assure each other 
mutually of their desire of peace and friendship. 
2. They will not either of them make or prepare to 
make any (unprovoked) attack upon the other or join in any 
combination or design against the other for purposes of 
aggression or become party to any plan or naval or military 
enterprise alone or in combination with any other power 
directed to such an end. And declare not to be bound at 
present by any such engagement. 
3. If either of the high contracting parties becomes 
entangled in a war with one or more powers in which it 
cannot be said to be the aggressor, the other of the high 
contracting parties will at least observe towards the power 
so entangled a benevolent neutrality and use its utmost 
endeavour for the localisation of the conflict. If either 
of the high contracting parties is forced to go to war by 
obvious provocation from a third party they bind themselves 
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to enter into an exchange of views concerning their 
attitude in such a conflict. 
4. They duty of neutrality which arises of the 
preceding article has no application in so far as it may 
not be conciliable with existing agreements which the high 
contrHcting powers have already made. 
5. The making of new agreements which render it 
impossible for either of the contracting powers to observe 
neutrality towards the other beyond what is provided by the 
preceding limitation, is exclused [sic] in conformity with 
the provision in article 2. 
6. The high contracting parties declare that they 
will do all in their power to prevent differences and 
misu~derstandings arising between either of them and other 
powers.@ 
The following is a "Copy of Draft Formula given by Sir 
Edward Grey to Count Metternich" on March 14: 
England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany 
and pursue no aggressive policy towards her. 
Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms 
no part of any Treaty understanding or combination to which 
England is now a party nor will she become a party to 
anything that has sue~ an object.@ 
@The two proposals that were discussed in Berlin are 
found in British Documents £g the Origin of the Warr ]898-
1914 volume 6 no. 506. Grey's proposed formula is also 
found in the British Documents volume 6 no. 537. The "New 
Draft" is printed in both German and English in Die Grosse 
Politik der Europaischen Kabinette, 1871-1914 volume 31 no. 
11395. 
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APPENDIX C 
MAJOR OFFICIALS DEALING WITH THE FORMATION 
AND EXECUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY FOR 
THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND GERMANY 
Asquith, Henry Herbert, British Prime Minister and First 
Lord of Treasury. 
Ballin, Albert, General Director of the Hamburg-America 
Steamship Company. 
Benckendorff, Alexander, Count, Russian Ambassador at 
London. 
Bertie, Sir Francis, British Ambassador at Paris. 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, German Imperial Chancellor. 
Buchanan, George w., Brit5sh Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 
Cambon, Jules, French Ambassador at Berlin. 
Cambon, Paul, French Ambassador at London. 
Cassel, Ernest, British Financier. 
Churchill, Winston, First Lord of Admiralty. 
Crewe, 1st Marquess of (Robert o. A. Crewe-Milnes), British 
.Secretary of State for India. 
Crowe, Eyre, Senior Clerk, British Foreign Office; 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. 
H. M. King George V., King of Great Britain and Ireland. 
Goschen, w. Edward, British Ambassador at Berlin. 
Gr~y, Edward, British Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. 
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Haldane, Robert Burdon (lst Viscount), British Secretary of 
State for War. 
Harcourt, Lewis, British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. 
Hardinge, Charles, Governor-General of India. 
Kiderlen-Waechter, Alfred von, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 
Kuhlmann, Richard von, Councillor of German Embas8y at 
London. 
Lloyd George~ Davie, Chancellor of the Exchequer.. 
McKepna, Reginald, (British 1st Lord of the Admiralty until 
1911); Secretary of St.4.i.<:> fr_1l Horne Affairs. 
Mallet, Louis, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affa.irs. 
Metternich, Paul von Wolff-, German Ambassador at London. 
Muller, Admiral Georg A. von, Chief of German Marine 
Cabinet. 
Nicolson, Arthur, British Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. 
Poincare, Raymond, Prime Mini8ter and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 
Schoen, Wilhelm von, Ambassador at Paris. 
Stumm, Wilhelm von, at German Foreign Office. 
Tirpitz, Alfred von, German Secretary of State for Navy. 
Tyrrell, William, Private Secretary of Sir Edward Grey. 
Widenrnann, Wilhelm von, Captain-Lieutenant, German Naval 
-Attache at London. 
H.I.M. William II, German Emperor. 
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